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Abstract 
This paper reviews changes in pension policies in EU countries between 1995 and 
2005 and describes how they might affect risk of poverty for future pensioner 
populations. The pension landscape in Europe has changed considerably in the past 
decade and the paper highlights commonalities as well as differences in pension 
reforms across these countries. A common trend is that the retirement incomes drawn 
from the public pension systems are on the decline, the changes are likely to shift 
more risks towards individuals, and there are fewer possibilities of redistribution in 
favour of the lower income individuals. The paper includes exploratory projections of 
how the risk of elderly poverty might evolve in the future. The countries where the 
benefit ratio is set to decline significantly, as expected, would see at-risk-poverty rates 
increase quite substantially, especially during the period 2025-2050, when the bulk of 
the decline is expected. This analysis points towards the importance of a more 
comprehensive assessment of the reforms, in particular in their impact on vulnerable 
groups (such as women and disabled people with disruptive work history) and in the 
clarity of the signals they give to individuals in extending their working career if they 
want to avoid greater risks of poverty during retirement.  
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1.  Introduction and background 
This paper reviews the most relevant changes in the pensions policy in EU25 and 
provides a description of how they might affect the risk of poverty for the future 
elderly populations. The analyses shed light on the expected evolution of poverty 
among the elderly for coming decades. These insights will be useful to identify any 
policy responses that might be necessary (if feasible) in order to meet the objective of 
not only sustainability but also adequacy of pensions in the 25 Member States of the 
European Union.  
 
The paper provides a systematic description of pension reforms that have been 
implemented in the period 1995 – 2005. It identifies specific elements in pensions 
policy reform such as whether there were any changes in accrual rates and in 
indexation; and whether there are provisions of additional financial instruments such 
as personal accounts. It then assesses how they are likely to affect the incomes of 
future generations of pensioners. This discussion provides pointers to the way in 
which the poverty of the elderly population is likely to be affected in the countries in 
question. 
 
The paper does not incluude the proposals of the UK Pensions Commission which 
were still under discussion at the time of writing but it does provide a comparative 
context against which to set them.  
  
Most of our work relies on the secondary analysis of published material. We cite and 
critically evaluate studies that have analysed the likely impact of the relevant policy 
changes. We draw on the latest projections provided by the Commission in their 
various studies. We also looked for information from the official sources about the 
rationale of the policy changes and what has been perceived to be the likely impact of 
these policy changes. In the last section of the paper we model the risks of poverty for 
the elderly population in the absence of other policy or behavioural responses.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a broad overview of 
changes in the pensions policy in the 25 Member States of the EU during the last 
decade or so, and what might be possible effects on these changes on pensioners’ 
incomes and poverty.1 Section 3 offers a thought experiment, in which we generate 
projections of the risk of elderly poverty in 2025 and 2050 for a selected set of 
countries. Section 4 concludes.  
 
                                              
1  Zaidi and Grech (2006) offers further quantitative evidence on the impact of pension 
reforms on pension benefits in EU25. 
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2.  Pension Reforms in EU countries and their possible impact 
2.1  Pension policy in EU countries: An overview 
? The pensions landscape in Europe is continuously changing and the 
systems that nowadays face many young workers in EU countries are 
significantly different from those present just ten years ago. In some cases 
the pension reforms have reversed dramatically the expected increase in 
spending on public pensions.2 For the convenience of analyses presented 
here, the reforms that have taken place can be classified into two broad 
sets: parametric and systemic reforms.  
 
The parametric reforms have maintained unchanged the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
nature of existing pension systems but made substantial changes to their underlying 
rules – such as those on the accrual of pension entitlements, the age at which benefits 
can be received, and the contribution periods required.3 Other countries have gone 
even further and opted for systemic reforms i.e. moving away from the PAYG 
defined-benefit (DB) structure and adopting new defined-contribution (DC) type 
schemes. Here one can discern two main types of reforms: World-Bank inspired 
multi-pillar reforms that set up systems of personal accounts (e.g. Slovak Republic, 
Estonia and Hungary) and the adoption of non-financial defined contribution (NDC) 
systems (e.g. Sweden, Italy, Poland and Latvia).  
 
Note that the distinction between ‘parametric’ and ‘systemic’ reforms principally 
reflects whether the country in question maintained its PAYG structure or not. This 
rule has its shortcomings. For instance, the two biggest countries in Europe, Germany 
and France, have not shifted totally to NDC (and thus they are categorised as countries 
which had parametric reforms), but they have introduced features that mimic the rules 
of a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) model. France has introduced a link 
between the number of contribution years and life expectancy while Germany has 
adopted a sustainability factor that links the level of pension benefits to the 
dependency ratio. In the same vein, Austria has also significantly modified its public 
                                              
2  Over the next 50 years, public spending on pensions is expected to decline in Estonia, 
Latvia, Malta, Austria and Poland, and remain relatively unchanged in Italy and 
Sweden. When one compares the projections of pension spending made in 2001 by 
the Economic Policy Committee and the Commission with those made in 2006, one 
finds that reforms made in just 5 years have managed to cut back more than a third of 
the projected impact of ageing. This downward revision was achieved despite the fact 
that that the new projections, presented in Annex 1 are based on assumptions of a 
sharper acceleration in ageing.  
3  The impact of parametric reforms can be quite considerable. For instance, whereas in 
2001, Germany was forecasting an increase of 5.5 percentage points in spending over 
the next half century, now it expects an increase of just 1.7 percentage points. 
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pension plans and could be said to now have a personal notional defined benefit 
account system.4  
 
? The recent period of pensions reforms has been driven mainly by growing 
concern about the economic impact of ageing and a need for fiscal 
restraint. A common trend is for public pension benefits to decline. The 
average public pension benefit ratio has dropped in the majority of the 
countries. We define this as the ratio of an average public pension to the 
average output per worker.  Moreover systemic reforms have changed the 
nature of pension provision from defined benefit type provisions to defined 
contribution type provisions.5 In general, but with exceptions, this type of 
change is likely to shift more risks towards individuals concerned (of the 
same generation), with a more restrictive redistribution in favour of the 
lower income individuals. 
 
A recent EPC report on spending on the elderly indicated that the average public 
pension benefit ratio across the EU25 would drop from 22% in 2004 to 17% in 2050 – 
a decline of more than a fifth.6 The EU Commission’s synthesis report on pensions 
also confirms that theoretical replacement ratios will drop significantly.7 The 
theoretical replacement rates are the level of pensions as a percentage of previous 
individual earnings at the moment of take-up of pensions, calculated for a hypothetical 
worker with a given earnings and career profile (in this case a male worker who works 
full-time for 40 years – with no career breaks - and always earns 100% of average 
earnings). The decline in the theoretical replacement rate are significantly more 
pronounced when looking at systemic reforms. For instance, the replacement ratio in 
Sweden is set to drop by nearly a fifth over the period 2004 to 2050. Multi-pillar 
reforms have exposed individuals to market-return risk and investment-choice risk 
(e.g. in Hungary the returns achieved up to now, if they persist, would mean that 
benefits under the new system would be lower than under the old system).  
 
A greater linking of benefits to contributions has also had negative implications for 
people with lower lifetime earnings, such as women. This linking has reduced the 
previous redistributive elements that were common in the majority of the public 
                                              
4  For more details, see Knell (2005).  
5  A pension scheme where the pension benefits are related to the member's pensionable 
earnings (either at retirement or during earlier working life) and number of 
contributory or credited years is known as a defined benefit scheme; and a pension 
scheme in which the pension benefits are linked to the fund value – this being 
dependent upon the contributions made into the fund, retirement age and also 
investment returns – is known as a defined contribution scheme. We will refer to them 
as DB and DC schemes, respectively. 
6  See Economic Policy Committee (2006).  
7  See European Commission (2006). 
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pension systems. Furthermore the high administrative costs of personal accounts are 
relatively more burdensome on lower income persons, who usually also do not have 
the level of financial education needed to make the right investment choices. 
 
Note that in view of rising longevity, the total cumulative pension wealth paid out to 
pensioners may still be at least as generous after the reforms as before the reforms. 
Thus, the overall impact might on balance be neutral or even resulting in more 
generous sum of pensions over one’s lifetime. However, for the purpose of the current 
project, our interest lies in how annual pension incomes may be affected by the 
reforms, mainly because the poverty risk calculations are based on pensioners’ annual 
incomes. Thus, our references to how the generosity of the pension systems have 
changed are viewed in terms of how annual pension benefits will be changed by the 
pensions reforms. 
 
Moreover, it can be expected that the policy reforms will be accompanied by 
behavioural changes in individual agents (such as a greater propensity to save, and 
possibly an extension of one’s working life). Without denying that there will be 
counteracting behavioural changes by individuals, we review the possible impact of 
pensions reform in a steady state scenario (i.e. if the generosity of pension benefits is 
on the decline, it is likely to increase risk of poverty for the future pensioners). Where 
necessary, we do refer to how behavioural changes of certain sort may reduce or 
enhance one’s chances of facing the risk of poverty in old age, and also where a 
switch away from public pensions may generate enough private pensions to mitigate 
the impact of a reduction in the generosity of public pensions. 
 
2.2  Parametric Reforms: Scope and possible impact 
? Most countries in the EU25 have opted to enact parametric reforms rather 
than systemic reforms. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
former have a smaller impact on pensioner incomes than the latter. The 
parametric reforms are different in that the change in the risk-shouldering 
aspects of the pension arrangement (for the current generation) is less 
than that observed in systemic reforms.   
 
The pension reform process met with considerable opposition. Nevertheless given 
developments such as European Monetary Union and growing international 
competition, policy makers have persisted and in many countries have succeeded in 
putting in place major pieces of reform. However, in the majority of cases, reformers 
have not pushed for a complete overhaul of their system, but have gone for parametric 
reforms. The reason for this was mostly the fact that shifts to fully funded systems 
were seen as financially unsustainable or presented too complex a challenge. Yet, 
though parametric reforms may seem less drastic than systemic ones, in practice their 
impact on the fiscal sustainability and pensioner welfare can be equally impressive, or 
even more so in some instances. For example, while the net replacement ratio is 
expected to decline by 4% in Hungary, which has gone for systemic reform, that in 
France is set to fall by 21%. The main difference between parametric and systemic 
reform lies not on the financial impact on pensioners (or contributors) but in the 
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sharing of risk between the current generation and future ones or the State (which 
becomes a custodian of the future generations in this respect).  
 
Parametric reforms, in fact, do not change public pension systems from a DB to a DC 
set-up. This has several important implications, such as the fact that longevity risk is 
still borne by the pension provider rather than the pensioner. Moreover redistribution 
is still possible under a DB system, something that is relatively impossible to achieve 
under a pure DC framework.              
 
? Parametric reforms may affect either the contribution side or the benefit 
side. Almost all countries in the EU25 have undertaken parametric 
reforms during the last decade. In some cases this preceded systemic 
reforms.  
 
On the contribution side, countries may change the percentage of income that needs to 
be paid or the income thresholds that apply. They may change the number of 
contributions required to qualify for a pension, affecting the effective retirement age. 
The state pension age, or the minimum age at which a pension starts to be paid out, 
can also be modified, a measure that affects both revenue and expenditure at the same 
time. On the benefit side, an important parametric change is any change in the 
indexation or uprating of pension benefits. In the same vein, Governments may 
change the benefit formula by modifying the accrual rates or altering the pensionable 
earnings. Related to this, countries have also in many cases tried to rollback the early 
retirement schemes that they had introduced earlier and also sought to extend working 
lives by offering benefits to older people who continued to work or defer their 
pensions.      
 
Documenting all parametric changes that have taken place in European public 
pensions during the last decade is a hefty task. However there are tools that enable this 
kind of analysis. Of particular importance in this regard is the ‘MISSOC Comparative 
Tables’ compiled since 1990 by the Mutual Information System on Social Protection 
(2006), which is restricted to just Member States of the European Union. This 
publication, along with other EC and OECD publications, enable us to get a concise 
snapshot of the major reforms in the rules and regulations underlying the old-age 
pensions in the 25 Member States of the European Union.  
 
Table 1 below summarises the main parametric reforms that have taken place, or are 
gradually being introduced, in the PAYG DB public pension schemes of the current 
Member States of the European Union. The parametric reforms are sub-divided into 5 
categories. In some cases, some countries that have made systemic reforms are also 
listed in the Table, e.g. Italy. This is because in these countries the old schemes still 
apply to older cohorts of workers, and Governments have sought to reform these also. 
In general the parametric reforms have been driven by the objective of increasing 
revenue or decreasing generosity in terms of annual pensions benefits paid out.  
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Table 1: Countries that made parametric reforms between 1995/96 and 2005 
Retirement 
Age 
Contribution 
Rate 
Contribution 
Requirement 
Benefit 
Indexation 
Pension 
Formula 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Portugal 
Slovak Rep. 
U.K. 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Finland 
Germany 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Slovak Rep. 
U.K. 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Rep. 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Austria 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Spain 
Slovak Rep. 
 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Rep. 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Hungary 
Italy 
France 
Luxembourg 
Portugal 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
Spain 
U.K. 
 
Source: Based on analysis of ‘Social Programmes throughout the World’, various editions, and 
‘MISSOC Tables’, various years; International Social Security Association (2006).   
 
a)  Retirement age 
As can be seen from Table 1, the most frequent reform (undertaken in 16 countries) 
has been changing the retirement age. This reform, though still quite politically 
difficult to push forward, tends to be more easily justifiable than reductions in 
generosity, as it can be linked directly to the increase in longevity. Moreover in many 
cases, the reform has just involved the equalisation of the legal retirement age for men 
and women.  
 
Only Eastern European New Member State countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Lithuania) and Italy have effectively increased the 
retirement age for both genders, while Denmark actually lowered it from 67 to 65.8 
However, the approaching of the retirement of the Baby Boom generation is 
increasing the willingness of Governments to actually push for this kind of change. 
The coalition Government in Germany intends to raise the state pension age from 65 
to 67. Similarly, independent Government-appointed pension commissions have 
recently recommended the extension of the full pension retirement age in both the UK 
and Malta. The UK Government has recently accepted such a move (DWP, 2006). 
                                              
8  A Government-appointed commission has, however, recently proposed for it to go 
back up to 66.  
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This reform increases both the revenues of Government, by adding more years of 
contributions, while it decreases the longevity risk borne by the State and the amount 
it needs to pay to contributors when they eventually retire.  
 
b) Changes to the contribution side 
The second most common reform during this decade has been modifying the 
contribution rate. Again while politically difficult, this reform can be justified as a 
means to bolster the finances of the state in advance of the demographic transition. 
Given the PAYG-nature of public schemes, this reform, on its own, does not 
necessarily reduce government spending. In some cases, such as Ireland and Finland, 
this reform has been accompanied by the setting-up of reserve funds that will be used 
to finance the increase in spending that is projected in future years. In this way, 
countries are able to conduct tax smoothing, increasing contribution rates only 
gradually over time and by a smaller amount as extra funds collected before the 
system goes in deficit would have earned interest. However, globalisation and the 
increased competition from lower-cost countries have reduced the willingness of 
Governments to go for this option. Some countries, e.g., the Netherlands and Sweden 
have even set a cap on contributions.    
 
Another measure that impacts on both revenues and expenditures is changing the 
contribution requirements to be eligible for pension benefits. One of the most common 
changes across Europe has been a scaling back of the early retirement schemes that 
had been put in place in the 1970s and 1980s. Contribution requirements for early 
retirement, or deductions for taking up pensions before the legal retirement age, have 
risen in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, the Czech and 
the Slovak Republics, Spain and Slovenia. More crucially, the period of minimum 
contributions needed to qualify for the maximum pension has been increased or is 
being raised in several countries, like Austria, Belgium, France and Italy. France has 
also introduced a significant reform under which after 2009, ‘the number of 
contribution years will increase following the increase in life expectancy through a 
rule keeping constant the ratio of the number of contribution years and the number of 
years in pension to the level of 1.79 as in 2003’.9  
 
This reform is interesting in that it introduces a form of automatic stabiliser in the 
public DB scheme that reduces the risk posed by longevity. The merit of this approach 
is that the individual, here, can still manage to qualify for a decent pension by working 
longer. The reforms based on NDC or personal accounts also provide this opportunity 
to the individuals to undertake remedial action of this sort to qualify for more 
generous pension benefits.        
 
                                              
9  See Carone (2005: 18).  
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c) Changes on the benefit side 
On the benefit side, more countries moved away from uprating of current pensions in 
line with earnings. Most EU countries now uprate benefits in line with prices – 
implying that over time pensioner benefits will fall in relation to general incomes and 
thus pensioners will lose out their relative position in their society.  
 
The changes in indexation relate to the benefit side and, unless people are well aware 
of their implications, they could end up having pension benefits that are lower than 
what they were expecting without any possibility of taking remedial action. As can be 
seen, there have only been a handful of countries that have changed the way they 
index benefits after retirement. However, this may be somewhat deceptive, as most 
countries had already effected these changes at an earlier date. Contrary to the 
commonly held perception, most pension systems in Europe nowadays are not 
characterised by earnings uprating but rather by price uprating. This implies that 
replacement ratios of pensions gradually decline with time, as the income of 
pensioners grows at a much slower rate (inflation) than that of the rest of the 
population (earnings). This results in a continuous decline in the relative position of 
the elderly (especially the oldest old).  
 
The countries shown in the Table represent the few who had still earnings uprating in 
1995, but since have moved away. Austria and Germany at first moved towards 
linking pensions to net earnings, so that the burden of any increases in social security 
contributions would be more fairly shared between workers and pensioners. Now they 
have both moved to an even less generous indexation: Austria moved to price uprating 
and Germany has introduced the ‘sustainability factor’ to adjust pension benefit 
indexation. Other countries, like Hungary and the Slovak Republic, went for the Swiss 
formula (50% price uprating and 50% earnings uprating) and in this way reduced what 
were previously wage-indexed pensions.  
 
The United Kingdom is proposing to move in the opposite direction having adopted 
price linking in the early 1980s. As we shall see later this is because the basic state 
pension has fallen so far below average earnings that the great majority of future 
pensioners would have become dependent on means tested pensions removing much 
of their incentive to belong to private funded schemes.  
 
? Pension formulas have tended to shift towards a lowering of the income to 
be replaced. 
 
Changes in the pension benefit formula are rather more complex reforms, especially in 
terms of their implications being fully understood by the average citizen. There are a 
wide variety of pension benefit formulae and thus it is hard to synthesise the main 
changes. However, broadly speaking, the formulae can be divided into two parts – 
accrual of entitlements and pensionable salary. The accrual side determines how much 
of the pensionable salary, the pension benefit will be replacing. Thus, for instance, the 
scheme could be based on having an accrual of 2% of the final salary for every year of 
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contributions. The other component, pensionable salary, amounts to the representative 
salary to which the earnings-related scheme is linked.  
 
Typically DB schemes (particularly in the private sector) have accrual schedules that 
are related linearly to the number of years in the system (i.e. same accrual rates for 
each year of contribution, irrespective of age and years already contributed for). In 
order to extend working lives, or alternatively to discourage early retirement, in recent 
years some Governments, such as Finland and Greece, have modified their accrual 
rates and tried to give higher entitlement to those who work after certain ages, or else 
have sought to make people work longer by reducing accrual rates. In other cases, the 
accrual rate may differ on the basis of earnings (Czech Republic and Portugal have 
higher accrual rates on lower earnings, and lower accrual on higher earnings; France 
and Sweden has higher accrual rates on higher earnings). There are also differences in 
accrual rates across sectors (e.g. Fire-fighters’ pension schemes in the UK, and the 
pension schemes for police in Greece, have much higher accrual rates compared to 
other sectors in the economy; the French pension system has separate accrual regimes 
for executives and nonexecutives10).  
 
A more readily understandable parametric reform involves changing the pensionable 
salary. Most countries used to have schemes that limited the determination of this 
salary to the final few years of a career, a period when someone would be near the top 
of his earnings history. However, in recent years, there has been a considerable 
lengthening of this period, so that the wage that is replaced is in many cases no longer 
very representative of the final salary of the person before he retires. Austria, for 
example, has moved away from using the 15 best years to the income earned during 
40 to 45 years of working life. Most notably, this kind of reform is likely to harm 
more those who had steep earnings career, and will be relatively beneficial to those on 
low-income trajectory. Other countries, like Portugal and Hungary, have also moved 
towards calculating the pensionable income as the average lifetime salary, while 
others, such as France, have just increased this period to be more in line with the 
required contribution periods. A new innovation made by Germany is the introduction 
of a ‘sustainability factor’ which links annual pension indexing to changes in the ratio 
of pensioners to workers supporting the system. German pensions are tied to a basic 
pension-point value component, which, in turn, is indexed to annual net wage growth. 
This pension-point value component is adjusted in line with the sustainability factor, 
so as to lower pension payouts for all German retirees as the pensioner-to-worker ratio 
increases over time. Thus pension payments are expected to be on the decline, which 
in turn is likely to raise the risk of elderly falling into poverty. 
  
                                              
10  See Legros (2006).  
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2.3  Systemic reforms and their possible impact 
In essence there have been two broad types of systemic reforms – those inspired by 
the World-Bank multi-pillar model and those setting up NDC schemes. Though in 
both cases, the main difference with DB public schemes is that the structure of 
determination of pension benefits changes from DB to DC, there are some major 
differences between the two strands of reforms and their impact on pensioners’ 
incomes is also likely to be quite distinct. 
 
Table 2: Countries that have made systemic reforms 
NDC Funded Second tier of 
mandatory scheme 
NDC First tier of 
mandatory scheme 
Italy 
 
 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania (voluntary) 
Poland 
Slovak Rep. 
Slovenia 
(supplementary) 
Sweden 
Sweden  
Latvia 
Poland 
 
 
Source: Based on analysis of European Commission (2006). 
 
a) World-Bank Multi-pillar reforms 
? Prior to accession, a number of eastern European countries opted to go for 
multi-pillar pension systems, often after assistance from the World Bank. 
These reforms, though they differ from that in Chile, were inspired by 
similar motives of moving towards a funded system and increasing the 
share in the economy of the private pensions. The systems face serious 
challenges (quite similar to those faced by Chile), with major issues 
surrounding coverage, high fiscal costs of transition and possible negative 
impacts on certain groups (such as women).  
 
The review commissioned by the World Bank on its assistance on pension reform 
reports that eleven of 24 Bank-supported European and Central Asian countries 
implemented multi-pillar reforms.11 Poland, Estonia, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, 
Lithuania and Hungary all implemented multi-pillar reforms before they joined the 
EU (and three other applicant countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia have also 
                                              
11  13 countries (of which only Slovenia is an EU Member State) also received small 
loans for parametric reforms.  
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gone down this path).12 However reforms in this region differ from those in Latin 
America, as multi-pillar systems in Europe tend to include a fairly substantial 
contribution-based PAYG pillar, for instance Hungary and Latvia. Moreover reforms 
in European countries tended to be influenced by the NDC reforms of Sweden and 
Italy (particularly in cases when Sweden was also a donor country) and in some cases, 
namely Poland and Latvia, the first pillar was converted from PAYG to NDC.    
 
When comparing Latin American and Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs), one notes two main differences - coverage and demographics. CEECs have 
an older population structure, but life expectancy is lower, while participation tended 
to be universal (a residue of the communist days). However the financial situation 
tended to be very similar, as the transition to market systems resulted in the creation of 
large informal sectors and the rise of tax evasion, while large unemployment and 
redundancies from privatised firms resulted in a worsening of the ratio of contributors 
to beneficiaries. In Poland and Hungary the number of contributors declined by 15% 
and 25%, respectively, and by 8% in the Czech Republic. Early retirement, in part, led 
to an increase in the number of pensioners by 10% in the Czech Republic, 20% in 
Hungary and a massive 50% in Poland.13 But the desire to join the EU (and therefore 
the implied adoption of the Maastricht criteria) meant that a full transition to a funded 
system was not possible as the transition costs would have been too high. Thus 
countries tended to go for the World Bank multi-pillar model.  
 
Setting up systems of individual accounts was seen as an effective means to boost 
financial sector development, help privatisation and spread the values of the market 
economy among the population.14 However several studies15 have noted that in many 
countries the preconditions for administering the systems were not in place and that 
there were serious implementation problems. In Hungary and Poland, the number of 
workers shifting to private accounts exceeded expectations and reduced the 
contributions to the PAYG pillar, reducing its sustainability. As in Chile, 
administrative expenses were relatively high and the industry had to consolidate in a 
way that a few companies started to dominate it. Markets for annuities proved to be 
difficult to set up; while pension funds ended up investing mainly in Government 
paper (which coupled with the high administrative costs implied by their decentralised 
set-up reduced the potential benefits for contributors). Moreover in some countries, 
e.g. Poland, the collection and the management of contribution records proved to be 
very problematic and were affected by administrative and technical hitches. In mid-
2003 the overall rate of inactive accounts (accounts created that do not have a single 
                                              
12  Sweden, an existing Member State, also introduced a mandatory DC funded pillar, but 
this is minor contrasted to its main pillar. 
13  See Fultz and Steinhilber (2003).  
14  See Wehlau and Sommer (2004). 
15  See Kritzer (2002).  
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contributions paid) was 18% of total accounts.16 The impact of these systems on 
women has also been little analysed, while the problems associated with coverage in 
the informal sector remain. It may still be too early to assess, but if the personal 
account systems of the CEECs evolves like that of Chile, a substantial proportion of 
individuals may opt to contribute just enough to qualify for the minimum pension 
guarantees (with the associated risks of poverty and political pressure on Governments 
to improve guarantees).17 
 
? In many cases the multi-pillar reforms are still too new for their long-term 
impacts to be evident. Yet, in some of the countries that went through the 
reform earlier than others, e.g. Hungary, there have been studies that have 
yielded some interesting insights.  
 
A working paper published by the Hungarian Central Bank18 notes that ‘the pension 
system, in its present form, is unsustainable with net implicit public liabilities in the 
system around 240% of GDP’. More crucially it notes that ‘the returns recorded so far 
in the private pension funds fall short of expectations and, on the condition that these 
low returns persist, the second pillar is projected to provide annuities that do not make 
up for the reduction in benefits received from the public pillar’. The Hungarian case is 
also interesting in that it shows that a move to full funding does not automatically 
result in sustainability. After the reform several parametric changes contributed to 
reverse any improvements in sustainability. The net implicit liabilities of the system 
had been just 60% of GDP prior to the reform, but a cut in contribution rates, the 
evening out of benefits between pensioners who retired in different years and the 
introduction of a 13th month pension contributed to boost the burden of the system. 
 
? Shifting to a pure DC structure increases risks shouldered by individual 
contributors (instead of the State, or the employer), and it reduces the 
redistributive element present in public DB pension schemes. Given 
gender differentials in employment, it also tends to lead to greater gender 
inequality. 
 
Personal accounts reforms introduce two elements of risk to pensioner incomes – 
namely investment risk and administrative charges risk, and these may lead benefits to 
be significantly different from those available under the old regime of public DB-type 
pension schemes. The move to DC also implied that contributions and benefits of an 
individual became directly linked (more than was the case in the DB system) and this 
                                              
16  For a full assessment of the myriad problems faced by CEECs, see Fultz and 
Stanovnik (2004).  
17  For more details, see Mitchell (2005). The average Chilean worker pays into the 
system about half of the time. Three-quarters of those not making contributions are 
women.  
18  See Orban and Palotai (2005: 5). 
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reduces the possibilities of affecting redistribution. Thus, such a move was negative 
for lower income individuals, as progressive elements in pension formulae were 
removed or decreased, cases in point being Hungary (1998) and Poland (1992 and 
1999). Moreover the shift from DB to DC means that longevity risk is shifted squarely 
to the shoulders of individual contributors of the same generation (and not borne by 
the State). Taken together all these measures tend to disadvantage those with low 
lifetime earnings. To further complicate matters, though countries have tended to 
legislate that gender-neutral mortality tables are utilised, there have been practical 
problems of implementing these annuity regulations with insurance companies 
reluctant to offer them and the market proving difficult to kick-start. Thus, the net 
outcome of these reforms increases the risk that women will continue to have lower 
annual pension incomes.  
 
? A further complication arises when individuals are given the option to 
shift voluntarily into the personal accounts system. Evidence from Poland 
and Hungary indicates that many opted to shift without having recourse to 
enough information. 
 
In many cases, people had the option of staying within the old public DB-type PAYG 
system or move to the personal accounts pillar. Similar to what happened in the UK 
with contracting-out of State’s earnings related pensions, there is evidence that in 
many cases people who switched may have become less well off as a result. A World 
Bank study carried out in 200019 shows that surveys in Poland from the end of 1999 
showed that ‘most people felt they were well informed and that information on the 
pension reform was readily available’, but then surveys often showed ‘that the 
knowledge of the pension system was limited to slogans rather than a deep 
understanding’ (Chlon-Dominczak 2000, pp. 60). Moreover while there are 
indications of rational switching, there is ‘some evidence that choices made were not 
based on a detailed understanding of the new system’. The study also notes that ‘a 
significant proportion of people simply joined the pension fund of the first agent they 
came across’.  
 
Orban and Palotai (2005) in their study on the Hungarian system remark that ‘it is a 
puzzle to researchers why so many people joined the multi-pillar system voluntarily, 
renouncing 25% of their pension claims from the PAYG after having contributed to 
the pure PAYG for a number of years’ (Orban and Palotai 2005: 12). They explain it 
‘by the fact that individuals perceived the market risk involved in accumulating 
savings in a pension fund to be lower than the policy risk of participating in a pure 
PAYG with very low credibility and an overall negative image’. Moreover they note 
that ‘this negative image was exploited by large-scale mis-selling and campaign from 
the part of pension funds, whose agents pressed and often misled customers in order to 
recruit more members’ (Orban and Palotai 2005: 12). There is also the widespread 
                                              
19  See Chlon-Dominczak (2000). 
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belief that Government will step in at some stage and compensate pensioners for a 
very unfavourable outcome.       
 
? The high administrative costs of the multi-pillar system are more 
burdensome to lower-income persons.   
 
Besides exposing contributors to investment return risk, the main negative element of 
the multi-pillar system is that it is based on a decentralised approach that implies a 
very expensive administrative cost structure. This is particularly negative on low-
income earners who have very small funds. Moreover the decentralised approach 
gives rise to competition that is not really based on the effective rate of return, but 
rather on marketing campaigns and large sales forces. This, not only impacts badly on 
the low income contributors who usually are the least able to evaluate critically these 
campaigns, and thus end up making the wrong choices, but also raises the costs of the 
system without leading to any benefit to participants. Whitehouse (2000) reports that 
countries with relatively similar systems based on individual accounts with individual 
choice of provider have average charges that vary from less than 15% to more than 
30%.20 This implies that for adequate replacement ratios to be achieved, contribution 
rates need to be relatively high, and since saving is a luxury good, this impacts more 
on low income workers than on high income ones. By contrast, in the state DB 
schemes, administrative costs were fairly small and were financed out of general 
taxation.  
 
b) NDC schemes 
? The NDC schemes, though still based on the DC method of determining 
benefits, differ significantly from the personal accounts systems. They tend 
to be less risky for individuals, especially for those on lower incomes, since 
the return on income is the same for all, and less costly as funds do not 
need to be invested, and there are no marketing and investment advice 
costs. By default, the longevity risk is faced by the individual contributors 
of the same generation, thus the current generation of workers will be 
faced with greater income risks compared to the situation in which they 
had contributed to the old system.  
  
Whereas the personal account systems are based on investing funds in the financial 
market, the NDC systems involve just notional accounts and thus the investment risk 
faced by individuals is very different. The rate of return faced under an NDC is 
centrally determined and reflects the formula chosen, whereas under the personal 
accounts system the return depends on the investment choices made by individuals 
and the performance and stability of financial markets. This has significant 
implications in that all people face the same risks on return under the NDC scheme, 
and thus there is no income inequality that results because of better investment 
choices, something that could possibly be correlated to the income level of an 
                                              
20  See Whitehouse (2000). 
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individual. NDC schemes thus do not place lower income individuals at a relative 
disadvantage arising from their relatively lower level of financial education and 
experience in investment choice.  
 
That said NDC schemes also have a form of ‘investment’ risk for contributors. This 
relates to any fluctuations in the notional rate of return that differs from the return 
under the PAYG DB scheme, which amounted to the annual accrual of entitlements. 
The NDC schemes, in fact, attempt to make the PAYG schemes automatically 
stabilising so that the ‘assets’ and ‘liabilities’ of the system balance out. For instance, 
in Sweden through the operation of the ‘automatic balance mechanism’, Government 
reviews annually the system and if the calculation reveals an unfunded liability, the 
notional account interest (set at the growth of average wages) and the indexing of 
annuities is reduced. Thus changes in the size of the contributing labour force are 
reflected in the rate of return earned on funds. With the NDC system, the financial risk 
of changing economic and demographic factors is shifted from the State to current and 
future pensioners. Besides this, the system also adjusts for longevity increases through 
changes in the annuity divisor, which converts the notional account upon retirement 
into pension benefits. As retirees’ life span increases, the monthly benefit available to 
individuals declines unless they delay retirement. Capretta (2006: 3) reports for the 
Swedish system that “based on mid-range demographic and economic assumptions, 
the Government projects that the life span adjustment will cut average monthly 
benefits for those continuing to retire at age 65 by 14% by 2055”. However, this may 
be compensated (albeit only partly) by behavioural adjustments (upwards) in the age 
at which people retire when faced with the prospect of low pensions benefits and 
rising life expectancy. Moreover, as mentioned by Capretta, “the Government expects 
the automatic balance mechanism to be triggered only ‘a few times’ over the next 15 
years, thus only modestly cutting the rate of return applied to the notional accounts” 
(Franco and Sartor 2006: 475).  
 
? While NDC lead to a securitisation of pension claims for individuals, and 
so may seem to reduce flexibility for Governments to cut benefits in the 
future, in practice the move itself has reduced the cost of future benefits.  
 
There is concern that the projections used by the Swedish Government may be 
optimistic (the current level of fertility and migration together with 2% permanent real 
wage growth) and the automatic balance mechanism will be used much more 
frequently than expected. In this case, the politically acceptability of the NDC system 
may be put under threat as its transparency means that individuals will be able to 
compare the rate of return on their notional accounts with that on market instruments 
(and ignoring the question of risk, charges, etc). This will put pressure on 
Governments to sustain the system by shouldering part of the change in economic and 
demographic factors itself. Furthermore as noted in Knell (2005)21 the NDC system 
leads to a securitisation of pension claims, making individual benefit levels difficult to 
                                              
21  See Knell (2005). 
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modify whereas under the DB systems where benefits were determined at the end of 
the career, it was easier for Governments to fiddle with the formula and lower 
benefits. However, the shift to NDC in itself, due to move towards lifetime averaging 
and the shift of longevity risk, may lead to such a reduction in benefits that 
Governments may be willing to face these additional risks. For instance, Franco and 
Sartor (2006)22 reports that in the Italian system “under the baseline scenario, the 
average pension earned at the age of 60 is reduced by 34 percent…the reduction in 
benefits reaches 50 percent if the lifetime stream of pension benefits is taken into 
account”. These reductions in benefits, if not compensated by additional contributions, 
are likely to increase the risk of elderly poverty.   
       
? Costs to administer NDCs are lower than multi-pillar and so the incomes 
accrued under these systems are higher than under personal accounts.  
 
Another major difference of the NDC schemes is that they are less expensive to 
administer than multi-pillar pension systems. This is not to say that multi-pillar 
systems cannot be organised in a way that reduces the administrative charges faced by 
contributors. The Swedish pension systems also includes a relatively small personal 
account component (2.5 percentage points out of the total 18.5% contribution paid) 
which due to its centralised organisation faces significantly lower costs than the multi-
pillar systems of CEECs, indicating that this type of risk can be reduced through 
reforms that decrease decentralisation.23 The system of personal accounts proposed by 
the Pensions Commission in the UK presents another example of how system design 
could focus on minimising administration, collection and selling costs. Nevertheless 
the personal account systems will always involve more administrative costs as they 
involve the actual investment of funds, and thus even if contributors are denied any 
rights of switching providers or given very little choice (both factors that could reduce 
administrative charges substantially) there would be the costs to influence 
investments, track them and administer them. Given that these are fixed costs, in a 
system of personal accounts these costs tend to disadvantage the lower income groups.  
 
? The use of gender-neutral annuity will contribute to reducing gender 
inequality (when total cumulative pension wealth is taken into account). As 
for annual incomes, both men and women will experience the decline in 
the benefit income that come about due to longevity risk passed onto 
contributors of the same generation.  
 
The adoption of the gender-neutral annuity is arguably the most redistributive element 
of a DC-type system. However, this is true only when one looks at the overall 
                                              
22  Franco and Sartor (2006). 
23  It may be indicative that market forces left alone are also leading to a lot of mergers in 
the private pension providers in the CEECs (also involving large pension funds of 
Western Europe).  
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cumulative sum of pensions payment. In terms of annual incomes, the gender specific 
risk of elderly poverty will not be affected by gender-neutral annuity rates. 
 
One critical element of the NDC pension system is how it credits absences from the 
labour market (such as those due to sickness and disability, and those for childcare). If 
the steady state scenario of a shorter working life career for women is assumed, the 
DC type pensions will reduce the annual benefits paid out to women.  
 
? The linking of benefits to contributions increases the importance of 
providing pension crediting for periods of non-work. Without adequate 
provisions of such credits, the shift to NDC systems reduces the generosity 
of the pension system towards carers. 
 
The shift to DC, and the determination of benefits by the amount of funds 
accumulated, makes it crucial to have in place adequate crediting systems for periods 
during which an individual is prevented by circumstances, such as sickness, 
unemployment, training or child and adult caring, from contributing. However, there 
is evidence that in many cases this element of reform was ignored. Thus, Fultz and 
Steinhilber (2003) reports that in Hungary contributors to the personal accounts 
system contribute 6% of their child care benefit to the pension system (instead of 
having credits as under the old system) and their future pension benefits will be 
calculated as a simple return on this contribution – i.e. investment performance minus 
management fees. Since this benefit is much less than wages, especially for middle 
and upper income earners, carers in Hungary will be worse off. In Poland the state 
pays a subsidy but this is based on the minimum wage and is ‘much less generous than 
it was before’. By contrast in Sweden, the state gives extra pension rights to parents 
with children under four, though Sweden’s 2005 National Strategy Report for 
adequate and sustainable pensions still stated that while “in principle, the national 
pension system gives everyone the same possibilities of building an adequate 
pension….many women still devote more time to unpaid work and less time to paid 
work than men, which results in lower average pensions for women.” (pp. 26-27).  
 
2.4  Concluding remarks 
? Reforms have been guided by fiscal sustainability concerns, and the net 
impact on risks of poverty for the current and future generations of 
pensioners is hard to measure.  
 
Though the recent pension reforms are expected to have significant economic effects, 
most of the studies that have been carried out to date have mainly focused on their 
effect on fiscal sustainability. This, in part, confirms that reforms were broadly driven 
by financial sustainability motives and there appears to have been very little 
assessment of the potential impact of these reforms on pensioner poverty. Thus, the 
World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group that recently reported on countries that 
followed the Bank’s advice on pension reform concluded that ‘there was insufficient 
attention on analysing the living conditions of the aged and exploring options for 
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expanding the safety net for those outside of the formal pension system’ and that 
‘Bank involvement in pension reform was often prompted by concerns about fiscal 
sustainability…yet, in doing so, there often was a neglect of the primary goal of a 
pension system: to reduce poverty and provide retirement income within a fiscal 
constraint’.24  
 
? The benefit ratio will fall by more than a fifth over the next 50 years.  
 
The recently released assessment of age related public expenditures by the Economic 
Policy Committee and the European Commission25 suggests that the projected benefit 
ratio (the ratio of average public pension relative to output per worker26) will decline 
by more than a tenth by 2025 and by more than a fifth by 2050. As can be seen from 
the Table below, there are many countries that are projecting a decline in relative 
public pension generosity. In some cases the magnitude of the decline is quite 
worrying, cases in point being most of the new Member States but also Germany, 
Austria, France Italy and Sweden. The data shown in the Economic Policy 
Committee/EU Commission paper indicate that the decline in the benefit ratio will 
offset nearly a third of the fiscal impact of ageing.   
 
                                              
24  http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/pensions/documents/press_release_pensions_ 
evaluation.pdf 
25  Economic Policy Committee (2006). 
26  Note that the benefit ratio does not measure the level of the pension for any individual 
relative to his/her own wage and, hence, is not equivalent to a replacement rate 
indicator. 
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Table 3: Projected benefit ratio 
 2004 2025 2050 Decline in generosity 
Belgium 17.7 17.6 16.4 -7% 
Czech Rep 15.7 13.0 14.1 -10% 
Denmark 20.2 19.3 19.2 -5% 
Germany 18.5 15.6 13.3 -28% 
Estonia 10.5 8.0 5.3 -50% 
Spain 17.2 19.0 17.1 -1% 
France 24.4 21.1 18.9 -23% 
Ireland 14.3 16.6 15.7 --- 
Italy 20.0 18.8 14.0 -30% 
Cyprus 25.6 25.5 30.8 --- 
Latvia 11.4 9.1 7.2 -37% 
Lithuania 7.7 8.6 7.5 -3% 
Luxembourg 23.5 26.4 28.0 --- 
Hungary 13.4 15.5 16.2 --- 
Malta 18.4 17.2 10.3 -44% 
Netherlands 19.5 18.2 18.1 -7% 
Austria 21.8 19.9 15.2 -30% 
Poland 25.0 18.4 10.7 -57% 
Portugal 18.6 17.2 15.4 -17% 
Slovenia 18.9 17.4 17.3 -8% 
Slovak Rep 13.0 12.0 8.8 -32% 
Finland 19.8 18.8 18.0 -9% 
Sweden 21.3 16.9 15.9 -25% 
EU25* 21.7 19.8 17.0 -22% 
 
* Excluding Greece and the UK that did not provide data.        
Source: Economic Policy Committee (2006). 
 
In some countries the expected decline, notably the CEECs, reflects a partial switch to 
the multi-pillar system, and so it could be partly remedied by the contribution of these 
new private personal accounts. However in other countries, the decline in generosity 
will not be offset by any other mandatory component. For instance, it is readily 
evident that countries that have turned towards the NDC formula, i.e. Sweden, Italy, 
Poland and Latvia will see a decline in annual state pension benefits, while countries 
that have introduced features that mimic NDC, i.e. Germany, Austria and France, will 
also reduce the liberality of their schemes. As stated previously, countries that have 
‘just’ undertaken parametric reforms have still managed to cut back pension income 
generosity considerably – for example Portugal is projected to see a decline of nearly 
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a fifth. At the same time, this projection exercise confirms that existing parameters of 
the pension system will be exerting a lot of influence on future generosity. For 
instance, in Malta the setting of a maximum pension ceiling that rises in line with the 
social wage27 means that by 2050 the system’s generosity will have fallen by more 
than two-fifths. Similarly in the UK, the Second Report of the Pension Commission 
has reported that if the Basic State Pension were to have remained indexed to prices, 
its value ‘as a percentage of median earnings would keep declining (from 19% today 
to 8% in 2050) and average state pension payments to pensioners would fall as a 
fraction of average earnings by about 27% over the next 45 years’ (Pension 
Commission 2005: 120).28. These are worrying trends, but a higher employment and a 
greater share of private pensions may partly offset them.  
 
? The take-up ratio of benefits is also set to drop by a fifth. There appears to 
be a trade-off between the take-up ratio and the relative benefit ratio, 
since a decline in the former will lead to higher pension benefit 
entitlements.  
 
Besides projecting a dramatic drop in the benefit ratio, the Economic Policy 
Committee/European Commission projection exercise also forecast a decline in the 
take-up ratio of public pension benefits over the coming 45 years. These projections 
indicate that on average take-up ratio will decline by nearly a fifth up by 2050, and 
will reduce the financial effect of ageing by nearly a fifth. These projections, 
presented in the Table below, indicate that on average take-up ratio will decline by 
nearly a fifth up by 2050, and will reduce the financial effect of ageing by nearly a 
fifth. Note that the number of pensioners in the table is greater than the number of 
persons aged 65. This is mainly because of the inclusion of persons who receive early, 
disability and survivors’ pensions and also because in some countries there are a 
number of pensioners who receive their pensions abroad (e.g. Luxembourg has a lot of 
migrant workers). In the majority of countries, the effective retirement age is also 
below 65 (e.g. France, Hungary, etc).     
 
                                              
27  In effect this means that this maximum rises by 2/3rd of the increase in the social 
wage, which in turn is the minimum wage plus some other social benefits. This wage 
is usually increased in line with inflation.  
28  See Pension Commission (2005).  
 21
Table 4: Projected take-up of pensions: number of pensioners receiving public 
pensions relative to the population aged 65 and over (in 100s) 
 2004 2025 2050 Decline in take-up 
Belgium 140 141 137 -2% 
Czech Rep 185 141 127 -31% 
Denmark 156 140 124 -21% 
Germany 160 140 124 -23% 
Estonia 173 146 130 -25% 
Spain 119 115 100 -16% 
France 132 122 115 -13% 
Ireland 135 127 117 -13% 
Italy 140 124 111 -30% 
Cyprus 102 113 115 --- 
Latvia 160 139 125 -22% 
Lithuania 241 222 182 -25% 
Luxembourg 201 209 235 --- 
Hungary 196 159 138 -30% 
Malta 116 108 103 -11% 
Netherlands 147 125 119 -19% 
Austria 185 148 117 -37% 
Poland 155 108 97 -37% 
Portugal 173 183 169 -2% 
Slovenia 175 149 132 -25% 
Slovak Rep 195 159 135 -31% 
Finland 158 129 122 -23% 
Sweden 138 135 135 -2% 
EU25* 149 133 122 -18% 
 
* Excluding Greece and the UK that did not provide data.        
Source: Economic Policy Committee (2006). 
 
The main reasons for these pronounced declines are reforms that increase the effective 
retirement age either through a direct increase in the statutory age at which pension 
benefits are received and/or through tightening access to early and disability pension 
schemes. A recent European Commission paper estimated that the average age of exit 
from the labour force could increase by as much as 2 years by 2025 in Germany, 
France, Finland and Poland.29 Measures of this sort impact most on the lower income 
groups, on account of their relatively shorter life expectancy and on their greater 
                                              
29  See Carone (2005).   
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dependency on state benefits to finance their retirement. This trend point to the fact 
that there will be significant reductions in the number of older workers who take up 
early retirement. Thus, a reduction in the take-up ratio is likely to result in a welfare 
enhancing pension income gains for the elderly. 
 
? Theoretical replacement ratios provide us with a useful indication of how 
pension systems are evolving, although they are derived from the 
replacement of income for stylised individuals (full-career workers, with 
average earnings throughout their working lives). Changes in net 
replacement rates offer us a proxy for the changes in the generosity of the 
system, and they are set to fall in 11 EU Member States.  
 
As analysed in some detail in Zaidi and Grech (2006), as many as 8 countries 
observed a significant decline in the net replacement rates, and for others the changes 
are moderate. Moreover, the gross replacement ratio before and after reforms in six 
EU countries varied differently across individuals who had earnings half the average, 
average and twice the average throughout their working career. In Germany, France 
and the United Kingdom, the reforms had a redistributive element as the reforms made 
low earning individuals better off (or less worse-off) compared to the average or high 
earning individuals. This differential effect is much stronger in Sweden and especially 
in the UK where recent changes in pension policy have concentrated on improving the 
incomes of the poorest pensioners. In contrast, the reforms in Poland and Slovakia 
appear to reduce the redistributive element that was present in these former socialist 
systems. Although these replacement rates are theoretical (as they are based on 
stylised working careers), they provide a good proxy of how the systems differ with 
each other and how systems evolved as a result of recent reforms. The reduction of the 
redistributive element is consistent with the fact that in the reformed systems benefits 
are closely linked with the contributory record of the individual in question. This 
trend, if continued, could result in a greater extent of poverty in the Eastern European 
new Member States and they will no longer able to maintain their status as the 
countries with lowest elderly poverty in EU.  
 
All in all, the pension landscape in Europe has totally changed from that of a decade 
ago, with a notable drop in generosity of pension benefits in a number of countries. 
Some reforms will impact on poverty in different ways than others. There is a need to 
reassess reforms and look for best practices in dealing with challenges posed by 
population ageing for the social sustainability of both the current and the future 
generations. 
 
3.  Projections of risks of elderly poverty in EU25 (2025, 2050) 
This section provides exploratory projections of how the risk of elderly poverty might 
evolve in the future. The underlying data for these projections is the median pensions 
to median earnings ratio (referred to as the generosity of the system). A simplistic 
methodology is adopted, so as to ensure transparency to the assumptions used in the 
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projections. At this stage, this work should be considered exploratory, and some 
further improvements in the specification of the regression model (particularly in the 
choice of explanatory factors) will be brought about in our follow-up work.  
 
3.1  The current generosity of public pension systems 
Table 7 presents data on the current overall generosity of pension systems. It 
compares the median individual pension income of retirees in relation to median 
earnings of employed persons aged 50-59, excluding private pensions and public 
social benefits other than pensions. 
 
Table 7: Median pensions relative to median earnings 
 Men Women Total 
Belgium 0.62 0.61 0.61 
Czech Republic - - - 
Denmark 0.74 0.71 0.71 
Germany - - - 
Estonia 0.70 0.68 0.68 
Greece 0.81 0.69 0.76 
Spain 0.49 0.61 0.49 
France 0.76 0.73 0.75 
Ireland 0.52 0.57 0.52 
Italy 0.82 0.71 0.78 
Cyprus 0.41 0.41 0.41 
Latvia 0.62 0.54 0.54 
Lithuania 0.68 0.61 0.63 
Luxembourg 0.75 0.83 0.77 
Hungary 0.68 0.72 0.71 
Malta 0.75 0.53 0.67 
Netherlands 0.43 0.42 0.42 
Austria 0.81 0.77 0.79 
Poland - - - 
Portugal 0.70 0.67 0.68 
Slovenia 0.74 0.61 0.68 
Slovak Republic - - - 
Finland 0.67 0.63 0.64 
Sweden 0.72 0.65 0.68 
UK - - - 
 
Source: The European Commission (2006) 
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? Public pensions are relatively generous across most European countries, 
with only 5 countries having median public pensions relative to median 
earnings of less than 60% (namely Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and the 
Netherlands). Men, in general, have better pensions. 
 
Among the five countries with the least generous systems, one finds Ireland and the 
Netherlands, who both have flat rate pensions. A similar situation appears to exist for 
the UK, even though data on median pensions are not available. However, while 
occupational pensions are widely available in the Netherlands and the UK and in fact 
constitute the largest pillar, they are not as widespread in Ireland.  
 
Generally, the level of pensions being paid to men exceeds in generosity than those 
being paid to women. There are only four countries where this is not the case, i.e. 
Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Luxembourg. In some countries there is a significant gap 
in generosity, notable examples being Malta, Greece, Slovenia and Italy (possibly 
reflecting a lower employment rate among women).  
 
? There appears to be a significant negative correlation between the 
generosity of public pensions and the risk of a higher poverty rate. This 
correlation is strongest for women and for people aged 75+.  
 
Figures 1-3 are a cross plot of the generosity of public pensions and the at-risk-of-
poverty rates at 65+ and at 75+. Although there are some outliers,30 this relationship 
appears to be statistically significant, with differences in generosity explaining 57% of 
the difference in risk-of-poverty rates for those 65+. Thus a country like Cyprus where 
public pensions amount to just 41% of median earnings, the lowest level among 
Member States, the at-risk-poverty rate is the highest in the EU-25. By contrast, 
Luxembourg – the country with one of the highest levels of generosity – has the 
lowest proportion of at-risk-of-poverty rate.  
 
When one limits the analysis to just women, the strength of the relationship increases, 
with the generosity of pensions exerting a stronger influence on reducing at-risk-of-
poverty rates. This reflects the fact that women are less likely than men to work, or to 
have other sources of income, beyond the age of 65. Again, women in Cyprus who 
face the least generous pension benefits have the highest at-risk-of-poverty rate, while 
those in Luxembourg are the least likely to be at risk of poverty (just 6%). 
 
                                              
30  Notably Latvia where less generous pensions do not seem to result in a significantly 
higher at-risk-of-poverty rate and Greece where though pensions appear to be 
generous, the at-risk-of-poverty rate is relatively high. Note that Netherlands has been 
excluded from this cross plot on account of the fact that public pensions represent less 
than half of the pension income of individuals (with the rest coming from quasi-
mandatory occupational provision). 
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Looking at people aged 75+, there is a correlation of 58% between the generosity of 
public pensions and the at-risk-of-poverty rate. The countries with median pensions to 
median earnings of less than 60% (excluding Latvia) have the highest levels of at-risk-
of-poverty among 75+. Furthermore, limiting the analysis to just women aged over 
75; one finds the strongest effect of pensions in reducing at-risk-of-poverty rates.    
 
Figure 1: Cross-plot: Public Pension Generosity vs Risk of Poverty 65+ (total) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cross-plot: Public Pension Generosity vs. Risk of Poverty 65+ (Men) 
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Figure 3: Cross-plot: Public Pension Generosity vs. Risk of Poverty 65+ 
(Women) 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Assessing the impact of pension reforms on the risk of elderly poverty  
? While the theoretical replacement ratios are useful indicators of a system’s 
relative generosity, they do not capture the actual replacement ratios faced 
by individuals. The median pension to median income ratio is more useful 
in this regard. Though projections of this ratio have not been produced to 
date, tentative projections can be made on the basis of the existing 
projections work done by the EPC and the EU Commission. 
 
The average benefit ratio projections published in the EPC-EU Commission paper on 
ageing-related public spending is a useful indicator of how future generosity of public 
pension systems will evolve. The definition of the benefit ratio – average benefits to 
output per worker – implies that it should evolve to a similar degree to the median 
benefit to median earnings (unless one assumes that the share of profits will be 
changing significantly over the coming years). Thus one may come up with a 
projection of the median pension to median earnings ratio based on the basis of 
projections made on the evolution of the benefit ratio. These projections are presented 
in Table 8 below.      
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Table 8: Projections of the median pensions relative to median earnings 
 Total Men Women 
 2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 2004 2025 2050 
Belgium 0,61 0,61 0,57 0,62 0,62 0,57 0,61 0,61 0,57 
Denmark 0,71 0,68 0,67 0,74 0,71 0,70 0,71 0,68 0,67 
Estonia 0,68 0,52 0,34 0,7 0,53 0,35 0,68 0,52 0,34 
Spain 0,49 0,54 0,49 0,49 0,54 0,49 0,61 0,67 0,61 
France 0,75 0,65 0,58 0,76 0,66 0,59 0,73 0,63 0,57 
Ireland 0,52 0,60 0,57 0,52 0,60 0,57 0,57 0,66 0,63 
Italy 0,78 0,73 0,55 0,82 0,77 0,57 0,71 0,67 0,50 
Cyprus 0,41 0,41 0,49 0,41 0,41 0,49 0,41 0,41 0,49 
Latvia 0,54 0,43 0,34 0,62 0,49 0,39 0,54 0,43 0,34 
Lithuania 0,63 0,70 0,61 0,68 0,76 0,66 0,61 0,68 0,59 
Luxembourg 0,77 0,87 0,92 0,75 0,84 0,89 0,83 0,93 0,99 
Hungary 0,71 0,82 0,86 0,68 0,79 0,82 0,72 0,83 0,87 
Malta 0,67 0,63 0,38 0,75 0,70 0,42 0,53 0,50 0,30 
Austria 0,79 0,72 0,55 0,81 0,74 0,56 0,77 0,70 0,54 
Portugal 0,68 0,63 0,63 0,7 0,65 0,65 0,67 0,62 0,62 
Slovenia 0,68 0,63 0,62 0,74 0,68 0,68 0,61 0,56 0,56 
Finland 0,64 0,61 0,58 0,67 0,64 0,61 0,63 0,60 0,57 
Sweden 0,68 0,54 0,51 0,72 0,57 0,54 0,65 0,52 0,49 
 
? Given the relatively strong negative relationship found between the 
generosity of public pensions and the at-risk-of-poverty rates, the 
anticipated decline in generosity is expected to result in an increase in at-
risk-of-poverty rates among the 65+. The worst affected countries appear 
to be Estonia, Malta, Austria and Italy, with most of the increase expected 
between 2025 and 2050. On the other hand, at-risk-of-poverty rates should 
decline in Ireland and Cyprus, where the pension system is expected to 
become more generous.     
 
On the basis of the projections of median pensions to median earnings, if one assumes 
that the current relationship between generosity of public pensions and the at-risk-of-
poverty rates holds, one can make projections of the proportion of the population aged 
65+ that could be at risk of poverty in 2025 and 2050. This analysis should, however, 
be treated with caution as:  
(a) it is based on the current relationship holding over the time; 
(b) it is based on a limited number of countries and so results may not be 
statistically very robust; and 
 28
(c) it had to be assumed that the decrease in generosity of the system for males and 
females would be the same percentage.  
 
In particular with regard to (a) one must note that this analysis ignores any growth in 
other sources of pensioner incomes, such as from private pensions, offsetting the drop 
in the generosity of the state system.  
 
The countries where generosity is set to decline significantly, as expected, would see 
at-risk-poverty rates increase quite substantially, especially during the period 2025-
2050, when the bulk of the reduction of generosity is expected. The at-risk-of-poverty 
rate in Malta and Estonia would end up becoming very close to that of Cyprus, while 
those in Italy, France, Austria, Latvia and Sweden would double. Pensioners, risk of 
poverty would become very acute for women in Estonia, Malta and Austria.  
 
Table 9: Projections of at-risk-of-poverty rates for 65+, 2025 and 2050 
 Total Men Women 
 Now 2025 2050 Now 2025 2050 Now 2025 2050 
Belgium 0,210 0,213 0,246 0,200 0,203 0,234 0,210 0,213 0,247 
Denmark 0,170 0,195 0,198 0,160 0,185 0,187 0,180 0,206 0,209 
Estonia 0,170 0,300 0,440 0,070 0,194 0,328 0,220 0,354 0,499 
Spain 0,300 0,259 0,302 0,270 0,232 0,272 0,320 0,267 0,323 
France 0,160 0,241 0,295 0,140 0,217 0,268 0,170 0,252 0,306 
Ireland 0,400 0,333 0,359 0,340 0,278 0,302 0,450 0,374 0,404 
Italy 0,160 0,197 0,347 0,130 0,167 0,313 0,180 0,215 0,356 
Cyprus 0,520 0,521 0,453 0,480 0,481 0,418 0,550 0,551 0,481 
Latvia 0,140 0,227 0,299 0,070 0,163 0,240 0,170 0,260 0,335 
Lithuania 0,120 0,061 0,133 0,050 -0,009 0,063 0,150 0,091 0,163 
Malta 0,200 0,235 0,436 0,190 0,226 0,436 0,200 0,229 0,393 
Austria 0,170 0,225 0,361 0,130 0,183 0,313 0,200 0,256 0,393 
Portugal 0,290 0,331 0,328 0,290 0,329 0,326 0,300 0,342 0,339 
Slovenia 0,190 0,233 0,236 0,110 0,154 0,157 0,230 0,270 0,273 
Finland 0,170 0,196 0,217 0,110 0,135 0,155 0,200 0,226 0,247 
Sweden 0,140 0,252 0,278 0,090 0,201 0,226 0,180 0,291 0,316 
 
nb: This list includes only 16 Member States. This reflects data availability and in the specific cases 
of Hungary and Luxembourg statistical issues related to the robustness of projections. 
 
? A similar picture emerges when looking at persons aged 75+, in particular 
for women. Only a handful of countries would have at-risk-of-poverty 
rates below 30%.  
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Given the fact that the over 75s are more dependent on state pensions, the anticipated 
decline in generosity is expected to increase risk-at-poverty rates by a significant 
margin for them. Only three countries would have rates lower than 30%, while for 
women most countries would have rates that exceed 35%. Malta and Estonia again 
would see the sharpest increase in the at-risk-of-poverty rates, but even countries like 
Sweden, Italy, Austria and France would see very significant increases. Conversely 
countries, like Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Finland would be having a moderate increase or a minor decrease. 
 
Table 10: Projections of at-risk-of-poverty rates for 75+, 2025 and 2050 
 Total Men Women 
 Now 2025 2050 Now 2025 2050 Now 2025 2050 
Belgium 0,21 0,213 0,255 0,20 0,204 0,246 0,21 0,213 0,255 
Denmark 0,23 0,261 0,265 0,25 0,283 0,287 0,22 0,252 0,256 
Estonia 0,18 0,341 0,515 0,03 0,197 0,378 0,24 0,404 0,582 
Spain 0,34 0,289 0,343 0,32 0,268 0,323 0,35 0,285 0,354 
France 0,18 0,281 0,348 0,15 0,253 0,322 0,19 0,290 0,357 
Ireland 0,44 0,357 0,389 0,35 0,266 0,299 0,50 0,407 0,443 
Italy 0,15 0,197 0,383 0,12 0,169 0,367 0,17 0,213 0,386 
Cyprus 0,67 0,672 0,587 0,67 0,672 0,586 0,67 0,672 0,586 
Latvia 0,16 0,268 0,358 0,05 0,176 0,279 0,21 0,320 0,412 
Lithuania 0,15 0,077 0,166 0,06 -0,020 0,078 0,19 0,118 0,206 
Malta 0,21 0,254 0,504 0,18 0,229 0,512 0,24 0,275 0,477 
Austria 0,18 0,249 0,418 0,10 0,171 0,346 0,21 0,278 0,446 
Portugal 0,35 0,401 0,397 0,35 0,403 0,399 0,36 0,411 0,407 
Slovenia 0,25 0,304 0,307 0,17 0,229 0,233 0,28 0,329 0,332 
Finland 0,25 0,282 0,308 0,15 0,184 0,211 0,30 0,332 0,358 
Sweden 0,20 0,340 0,372 0,14 0,289 0,323 0,24 0,376 0,407 
 
? These projections must be interpreted with caution. In particular, it must 
be stressed that they assume that the decline in state benefits is not 
compensated by individuals´ behavioural responses to work longer or 
accrue greater income from private pensions. 
 
These projections have assumed throughout that the only thing that matters for the at-
risk-of-poverty rates is the generosity of the state system. However this does not give 
an entire assessment of the actual sources of income of current pensioners, let alone 
future ones. These projections must rather be interpreted as providing an indication of 
what could happen to elderly poverty if individuals do not work more or save more.  
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In our follow-up work, we will assess to what extent a more rigorously defined 
regression model will result in any different sets of projections. It will be tested 
whether other factors (such as a decline in the take-up ratio) might mitigate the 
increase in the elderly poverty projected in some countries. Moreover, we will test to 
what extent (projected) data on other explanatory factors could serve as the 
explanatory factor in such projections.  
 
4.  Synthesizing discussion 
This paper has sought to describe briefly the pension reforms that have taken place 
during the last decade or so in the present 25 Member States of the European Union. 
While in 1995, nearly all the Member States of the EU had an earnings-related DB 
PAYG scheme as the main centrepiece of their pension system, by 2005 nearly half of 
the Member States had shifted towards other pension models, notably personal 
accounts or NDC schemes. Moreover all countries had, or considered, changes to their 
state pension schemes during this time. In most cases the reforms were mainly driven 
by fiscal sustainability concerns and the impact of these reforms on income adequacy 
and pensioner poverty do not appear to have been given significant consideration. In 
particular, the effects of systematic shifts on particular groups, such as women and 
lower income earners, have not been assessed in great depth. The current paper takes a 
first step in that direction.  
 
The qualitative analyses included in the paper point us to three main issues:  
(i) To what extent individuals are aware of the impact of the changes that are 
happening in the pension system, and whether they are trying to accommodate 
these by increasing their savings and employment;  
(ii) In the absence of a positive behavioural change, will certain groups, 
particularly lower income earners with a worse state of health and less 
employable skills, be able to adjust their working lives to maintain their living 
standards in retirement; and  
(iii) Will these reforms prove to be politically sustainable in the face of growing 
elderly electorates? The scope of the reductions in generosity in annual pension 
benefits appears to be rather large in some countries, and further increases in 
longevity will mean an even more pronounced decline.  
 
These issues point towards the need to reassess most of the reforms that have been 
carried out and outline those that are less likely to result in pensioner poverty. For 
instance, France’s reform to link the number of contribution years required to qualify 
for the state pension with longevity may be less socially risky than Germany’s policy 
to link the value of pension benefits to the dependency ratio. This is mainly because 
the French policy sends more clear signals to individuals that they need to work longer 
to qualify for the same benefit, rather than simply giving them a smaller benefit and 
then possibly facing a political backlash and having to increase this benefit. Similarly 
the administrative structure adopted by the multi-pillar reforms in the CEECs needs to 
be looked at and reformed in a way as to reduce administrative costs and make the 
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systems less burdensome on low-income earners. Moreover policymakers need to 
ensure that individuals understand the choices before them, particularly the longevity 
risk, and that incentives for savings must increase. Policymakers need to remember 
that pensions were not introduced by chance, but were the result of social consensus 
that poverty amongst the elderly must be eliminated. If pension systems end up failing 
this main task, it is very probable that the social forces that combined to create 
pension systems may unravel the recent reforms that have taken place.  
 
In a way the experience of the UK confirms this. The process set in place with the 
1980 reforms, which were leading to an ever-falling level of state pensions, has been 
halted in recent years, with measures such as the introduction of pension credit and the 
state second pension. The propositions set forth in the white paper 'Security in 
retirement: towards a new pension system', such as the re-linking of the basic state 
pension and measures to set up a system of personal accounts, also in effect imply a 
move away from the purely voluntary approach to pension provision advocated in the 
1980s. The UK experience may thus be taken as an example of how pension reforms 
that look solely at ensuring fiscal sustainability may require further changes once the 
effects on pensioner poverty become more apparent. Policymakers, thus, need to 
ensure that reforms aim at ensuring not only sustainable pensions, but also adequate 
pensions. 
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